What Iran will do next, and how to stop it?


Predictably, Iran is reacting badly to the announcement that Europe is planning to send a multinational naval force to protect merchant shipping passing through the Strait of Hormuz. “We heard that they intend to send a European fleet to the Arabian Gulf which naturally carries a hostile message, is provocative and will increase tensions,” said an Iranian government spokesman this week.

In combination, the Europeans’ welcome decision to increase the warship count and the Iranian response — only verbal thus far, thankfully — are likely to increase the chances of a military miscalculation that provokes a shooting war. The strategic backdrop, of course, is the US-Iranian conflict that is being played out in the aftermath of the American pullout from the 2015 agreement to circumscribe the Iranian nuclear programme. Disappointed with the somewhat limited scope of that agreement, the Trump administration withdrew, much to the dismay of our European allies, and proceeded to levy harsh economic sanctions on Iran. In response, the Iranians are trying to show the world that they control the Strait of Hormuz and can close it if they choose, thus causing significant disruption to the global economy.

This disruption strategy is somewhat akin to a protection racket: “That’s a nice naval strait you’ve got there, and it would be a shame if something were to happen to it.” The Iranians are striking Saudi oil assets, shooting down US drones, affixing mines to ships and, most recently, seizing a British tanker. So far, the Western response has been strong — Washington is tightening sanctions and now the Europeans (not including, alas, Germany) are literally getting on board with the US. So what happens next? What are the Western allies’ options to defuse the crisis but still keep up the pressure to modify Iran’s bad behaviour? 

Tehran not relenting It seems clear the Iranians have little inclination or motivation to back down. They will probably increase the aggression toward merchant shipping, either putting mines in the Strait of Hormuz (which they did as part of the so-called “tanker wars” in the 1980s) or actually sinking a ship, probably surreptitiously using a diesel submarine.

They could also widen the conflict “horizontally” by unleashing their surrogate terrorist organisation in Lebanon, Hezbollah, against Israel, or having its Afghan spinoff, Liwa Fatemiyoun, carry out attacks against US troops in Afghanistan. If Iran takes such a reckless course, the West will likely respond militarily. Certainly the international escort mission will be ramped up in size and intensity. The US part of it — which will be called Operational Sentinel, according Gen. Joe Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — will include significant intelligence, logistic and command and control support. Based on my own decades of experience in the Gulf, including commanding the Enterprise Carrier Strike Group during the Iraq invasion in 2003, I am certain that the US Central Command’s operational plans will give the president plenty of options.

These likely include sweeping mines (the Navy has the craft for this based in nearby Bahrain); sinking Iranian warships, which the US did as part of the “Praying Mantis” operation in the late 1980s; striking Iranian land-based air defences (which was to have been a part of the attack Trump paused at the last minute in June); and conducting an offensive cyber operation against Iranian military assets, and possibly even the nation’s civilian electric grid at the point where it supports the military infrastructure.

Can the US and its allies avoid a shooting war? Maybe. The incentives ultimately drive each party toward the bargaining table. The US will demand real modifications in Iranian behaviour: Stopping their proxy wars in Yemen and Syria; ending support for Hezbollah’s aggression toward Israel; paring down its ballistic missile programme; and, above all, a longer-term nuclear agreement.

The Iranians will want the sanctions lifted, access to international capital, and guarantees against any attempt at regime change by the US. The sides are far apart, to say the least. Tactically speaking, look for things in the Gulf to get worse before they gets better. But over time, it’s not in anyone’s interest to stumble into a war — certainly not for Trump with the 2020 election looming. There is room for a deal, but the odds of miscalculation continue to rise.

James Stavridis is a retired US Navy admiral and former supreme allied commander of Nato