Iran doesn’t need a nuclear programme


With Iran announcing that it has breached uranium-enrichment limits agreed in the 2015 nuclear deal, let’s take a quick trip down memory lane, to remind ourselves of how we got here.

The first thing to keep in mind - and it is often forgotten - is that Iran has only ever had one reason to start a nuclear programme: to menace its neighbours. This was true for Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in the 1950s, and it is true of the theocratic state that has followed.

In 1974, in a moment of rare candour, the Shah admitted he wanted nuclear bombs. Iran’s current rulers have been careful not to declare their intention: they say it has more to do with proving Iran’s scientific prowess, and with a view to one day producing nuclear energy, but not for military applications. Indeed, Iranian officials have claimed that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons.

This protestation is problematic in many ways. Sitting on some of the world’s most abundant supplies of oil and natural gas, Iran has no need for nuclear energy. It is not expending comparable state resources on other alternative energy technologies, like solar or wind power.

And the excuse that Iran wanted to show off its scientific capabilities doesn’t wash. These days, nuclear technology is no indication of great technical accomplishment: as North Korea has demonstrated, pretty much any country that sets itself to develop the technology can do so, if it is prepared to brave international opprobrium, and sanctions.

The only logical reason for Iran to have a nuclear programme was to signal to its Arab neighbours that it was capable, at least in theory, of building the ultimate weapon. It is no accident that the nuclear programme accelerated after the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. The regime in Tehran, still isolated from much of the world, needed anything - even a theoretical nuclear threat - to avert a repeat of that disastrous conflict.

But as the Iraqi threat receded in the 1990s, the Iranians began to expand their influence in the Arab world, typically by deepening ties with terrorist groups - like Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Gaza. During this period, the regime kept up the charade that its nuclear programme was small, and entirely benign.

Mischief through its proxies

But there were actually two Iranian nuclear programmes. The second was conducted in utmost secrecy, until it was revealed in 2002, when a uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy-water facility in Arak came to light. Caught out in its lie, Iran suspended its quest for nuclear weapons in 2003, but continued enrichment. The message to its neighbours remained unchanged: we’re only a few steps away from having the capacity to make the Bomb. Meanwhile, Iran continued to perpetrate mischief through its proxies.

The world reacted by placing Iran under sanctions: the United Nations in 2006 and 2010, before the Western powers imposed even more restrictions in 2011 and in the years that followed. Iran remained defiant even as its economy atrophied, and its currency tumbled. Finally, in 2013, the regime signalled an openness to negotiations. Khamenei, channelling George Orwell, described this U-turn as an act of “heroic flexibility.”

Two years of complex negotiations followed, between Iran and the world powers - the US, the EU, Germany, Russia, China, France and Britain. The discussions centred on the nuclear programme, and not on Iran’s other malign activities. Eventually, they came up with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which restrained the nuclear programme for 15 years. In exchange, Iran was to re-enter the global financial system, increase oil and gas exports, and access as much as $150 billion in frozen assets.

The Obama administration declared the deal a great bargain, an end to Iran’s history of nuclear deceit. It was a disaster, giving the regime a shield from behind which it could continue to menace them. Iran’s neighbours feared that access to billions of dollars in unfrozen assets and new revenues would allow the Iranian regime to fund ever more ambitious efforts to destabilise the region. And indeed, the Islamic Republic significantly increased its support for its proxies and allies.


As the Iraqi threat receded in the 1990s,

 the Iranians began to expand their

 influence in the Arab world, 

typically by deepening ties with 

terrorist groups - like 

Hezbollah in Lebanon, 

and Hamas in Gaza. During this period,

 the regime kept up the charade that

 its nuclear programme was small, 

and entirely benign


The biggest beneficiary was the Syrian dictator Bashar Al Assad, with Iranian fighters and proxies joining in his genocide against the country’s Sunni majority population. For good measure, the regime also stepped up assassinations of opponents on European soil.

Last year, President Trump pulled the US out of the deal, and began imposing tighter sanctions, re-designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist group, and sanctioning Khamenei himself. But what the Trump administration hopes to achieve is unclear - simply a better nuclear deal than the JCPOA, or a grand bargain incorporating all of Iran’s chronic misbehaviour.

Now, apparently giving up hope that the other JCPOA signatories can help it evade the sanctions, Iran says it will gradually abandon the nuclear restraints it agreed to in 2015. The days ahead will see debates about how much enrichment amounts to an actual threat. Should we start worrying when Iran has 1,000kg of uranium enriched to 3.67 per cent? Or can we remain sanguine until they begin enrichment to 20 per cent?

The Iranians will likely remain - or at least give the impression of remaining - within enrichment levels that allow them to claim they’re not actually trying to make nuclear weapons. But remember: there is no other reason for them to have a nuclear programme.


Bobby Ghosh is a columnist with a special focus on the Middle East.