Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg
The last year has been pivotal for Middle Eastern security in several meaningful ways. It has witnessed several crises and breakthroughs: Syria topped the list, but there were also key developments in Gaza, the West Bank, Iran, Yemen and Sudan. The reverberations from these hot spots are likely to continue into 2026.
Syria witnessed the most profound transformation in its recent history following the fall of the Assad regime after decades of a ruthless dictatorship, which turned the country into a narco-state, a haven for terrorists and a vassal for Iran. All that changed thanks to Syria’s new leader, Ahmad Al-Sharaa.
When US President Donald Trump met Al-Sharaa in Riyadh in May, at the behest of Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Trump announced the lifting of sanctions against Syria. The two clicked. They met again in September in New York and at the White House in November, each time Trump heaping praise on the young leader, which is remarkable considering that, until recently, the US had a bounty on his head as a leader affiliated with Al-Qaeda, America’s nemesis.
His redemption was complete in the eyes of Washington. But that message escaped Benjamin Netanyahu and Israel, which launched hundreds of attacks against Syria with the clear intent of destabilizing the new government. Syria’s efforts to integrate into the regional and international orders as a normal state will contribute significantly to the Middle East’s security and stability, and eventually its prosperity.
Israel intensified its genocidal war against Gaza in 2025, taking advantage of the transition period following the arrival of the Trump administration in January. The new administration appeared sympathetic to Israel, entertaining the idea of emptying Gaza of its Palestinian inhabitants and turning it into a giant beach resort. It tried to persuade other countries to take them in, with little success.
In March, Israel tightened its blockade of Gaza, blocking all aid and causing mass starvation. The pressure of world opinion grew, including in the US and among Trump’s base, which in 2025 shifted decidedly against Israel. Repeated UN resolutions, which the US voted against but failed to stop, highlighted Washington’s isolation on this issue. After Israel attacked Qatar, a close ally of the US, in September, the administration decided to act.
Later that month, Trump met with Arab and Muslim leaders in New York and announced his 20-point plan for peace in Gaza, followed by a ceasefire on Oct. 10 and the Sharm El-Sheikh summit three days later. The US then persuaded the UN Security Council to adopt the plan, which it did last month, despite the misgivings of China and Russia.
There was another major alignment during 2025 in favor of the two-state solution and recognition of the state of Palestine, despite the Trump administration’s attempts to scuttle the efforts exerted by Saudi Arabia, France and other countries to mobilize support for the initiative. The vote at the UN in September was overwhelmingly supportive and the White House finally backed down. After some of its major allies recognized the Palestinian state, the administration stopped threatening those that planned to take that step with sanctions.
This has not been a good year for Iran. Following the loss of Syria and decimation of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran and its proxies continued to suffer severe blows during 2025. The 12-day war Israel waged on Iran in June, which included American strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, marked a dangerous escalation not seen in decades.
The strikes did not lead to a breakthrough in the nuclear talks; Tehran continued its defiance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which it is a party, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Instead, Iran attacked Qatar, one of its few remaining friends, setting back regional diplomatic efforts for reconciliation between the two shores of the Gulf.
In March, the US launched intensive air and naval strikes against the Houthis in Yemen, another Iranian proxy, in response to the group’s attacks on international shipping. The UK joined in but the strikes stopped abruptly in May through Oman’s mediation. Attacks on shipping stopped for two months, but then the Houthis struck again in July. Just like the first time the US and UK launched such strikes against the Houthis in 2024, there was no political component to the attacks.
The UN, which owns the political track, did not intervene. It all but stopped its mediation in Yemen following the start of the Gaza war in 2023. After scores of its staff were detained by the Houthis, it decided to leave Sanaa altogether in 2025.
With the UN mediation on life support and the Houthis riding high on anti-Western sentiment in Yemen, they launched repeated incursions into government-controlled areas, without much success. The lines have remained largely unchanged since a truce was announced more than three years ago.
However, the Southern Transitional Council, a group seeking independence for the south of the country but formally part of the governing Presidential Leadership Council led by Dr. Rashad Al-Alimi, kept the pressure on government forces, making gains at times, thus weakening the government camp and emboldening the Houthis.
In Sudan, the war between the armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces militia raged during 2025. After a streak of victories for the Sudanese army in the east of the country, liberating major cities including the capital Khartoum, it suffered big losses in the west, as the rebel group gained the upper hand in the battle for El-Fasher, which resulted in untold losses among civilians.
The UN has described the situation in Sudan as a “crisis of staggering proportions, with civilians paying the highest price.” It estimated that more than 30 million people, almost two-thirds of Sudan’s population, are in need of humanitarian assistance.
There was a glimmer of hope when Trump announced in November that, at the behest of the crown prince, he had decided to engage more on Sudan. Through what is known as the Jeddah Platform, Saudi Arabia and the US have been working together for some time to mediate the conflict in Sudan. Trump’s announcement made it clear that he intended to reenergize US mediation efforts.
The year has seen several remarkable successes for Saudi diplomacy, starting with the fact that Trump made Riyadh his first foreign destination following his return to the White House in January. In May, Saudi Arabia hosted a GCC-US summit and a Saudi-American investment summit, both of which were attended by Trump.
In November 2024, Saudi Arabia hosted an extraordinary Arab and Islamic summit focused on the Gaza crisis. The summit empaneled a committee of foreign ministers, headed by Saudi Arabia’s. The committee traveled to world capitals, starting with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, to mobilize the international community to stop the war in Gaza, press Israel to allow aid in, and support the two-state solution as a way to deal with the underlying causes of the war.
In particular, throughout this year, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan has worked tirelessly to promote the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution. The alliance is a Saudi initiative that finally succeeded in translating its efforts into a UN resolution in support of that goal, while also increasing the number of countries recognizing Palestine to about 160, or 83 percent of the UN membership.
In September, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a landmark strategic mutual defense agreement, stipulating that any attack on either country would be considered as an attack on both. The agreement formalized long-standing ties going back almost 80 years, including in defense cooperation.
While this region has had more than its fair share of crises, other parts of the world also experienced tectonic changes during 2025. The Ukraine war ground on, without clear prospects for peace. Saudi Arabia hosted talks between the Americans, Russians and Ukrainians, thus kicking off several diplomatic efforts elsewhere between the three parties. The Ukraine war has had serious spillovers for the Gulf region, which explains why most Gulf Cooperation Council member states are offering their good offices to the parties.
And although the India-Pakistan and Afghanistan-Pakistan clashes, and Azerbaijan-Armenia truce, were important developments during the year, they are not likely to seriously affect regional security during 2026. Nor will the reactivation of the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere likely affect events in the Middle East, except in the implicit deterioration of respect for international law and the role of UN institutions in mediating conflicts.
The more countries take the law into their own hands, as Israel and Iran do in our region, the worse it is for law-abiding nations that believe in the UN-centered rules-based world order.
Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg is the GCC assistant secretary-general for political affairs and negotiation.
